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Immunity to the Arab Spring? Fear, 
Fatigue and Fragmentation in Algeria 
 
EDWARD MCALLISTER* 
 
ABSTRACT Rather than asking why the Arab Spring has not spread to Algeria, a question 
that necessitates a comparative approach, this paper will argue that the localised protests 
that have become a familiar feature of Algerian life for over half a decade respond to 
Algerian dynamics and have continued to do so in the wake of the Arab Spring. As part of an 
on-going research project, this paper will use social memory to explore the contradictory 
nature of Algeria’s past-present relationship, by looking at experiences which at once define 
what Algerians expect from the state and demobilise energies for collective change. The 
paper will argue that the fragmented nature of narratives about the past, as well as related 
generational divides, are factors that have inhibited the growth of cohesive movements 
demanding political change. In addition, the paper will look critically at assumptions that 
fears of a return to the violent 1990s are defining reticence toward revolution in Algeria, and 
will suggest that the riots of October 1988 provide a more useful reference point for 
understanding the clear lack of enthusiasm for a home-grown Arab Spring. 
 
 
[Editor‘s Note: This paper won the New Middle Eastern Studies Best Paper Competition at 
the 2012 BRISMES Graduate Section Conference.] 
 
Introduction: Algerian Protests and the Arab Spring Contagion Paradigm 
 
The localised street-based protests and riots in Algeria that make the headlines of national 
newspapers began at least half a decade before the onset of the Arab Spring and have 
continued unabated both during the zenith of the Spring and throughout its aftermath. Official 
figures show 112,878 interventions by riot police in 2010 and 18 interventions per day in the 
first half of 2011.
1
 Indeed, long before the actions of Mohammed Bouazizi that sparked the 
Arab Spring, Algeria‘s first case of self-immolation occurred in May 2004, when a 40-year 
old man from Djelfa in the High Plateaux of central Algeria set fire to himself after the 
seizure of his assets by the courts. In October 2009, a father doused himself and his entire 
family with petrol and set them alight in front of the council offices in the north western city 
of Chlef after their home, deemed by authorities to be an illegal construction, was 
demolished.
2
 Yet despite these and other similarities, this paper will argue that Algeria‘s 
recent protests have come primarily in response to Algerian dynamics and that their analysis 
within the same framework as the mass protests seen in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010-11 is at 
best problematic. The paper thus seeks to underscore the specificities of the Algerian context, 
rather than analysing the country in a regional-comparative framework.  
                                                          
* University of Oxford. I am grateful to several people for their input, support and encouragement: to Hakim Darbouche for 
his reflections on Algeria and the spread of the Arab Spring, to Sarah Covington for her analysis of the Algerian protests, 
and to James McDougall for his insights into the 1990s and much else. 
1 Quoted in Liberté, 05/12/10 and El Watan, 09/06/11. 
2 For both these cases, see ―Voyage dans l‘Algérie des immolés‖, in El Watan, 29/01/12. 
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Rather than asking why the Arab Spring has not spread to Algeria,
3
 this paper posits that 
a more relevant question may now be ‗why should we expect the Arab Spring to spread?‘ A 
commonly expressed view in the media at the time of the Arab revolutions was that any 
country in the region could be next, and regimes were almost expected to fall in a sort of 
domino effect.
4
 The assumption that the revolutions are contagious stems partly from the 
perceived existence of a common cultural space with similar socio-economic indicators and 
similarly authoritarian political systems across the region. While shared culture has been 
recognised in media reports as being insufficient in itself to encourage the spread of 
revolution across borders, an insistence on empirical socio-economic data such as 
unemployment figures
5
 also seems lacking, since statistics often reduce soft context-based 
realities to hard statistical categories
6
, ignoring, for example, the extent to which informal 
economies provide regime stability. Authoritarianism is conceptually too broad to support 
expectations of region-wide contagion given, for example, that political power is not as 
personalised, nor is wealth as concentrated, in Algeria as it was in Zine el Abidine Ben Ali‘s 
Tunisia or Hosni Mubarak‘s Egypt. This one of the reasons Algerians generally do not hold 
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika personally responsible for the situation in Algeria. Perhaps 
most importantly, though, the idea that the Arab Spring should spread is problematic in that it 
appears to rest on the premise that all Arab societies want the same thing, a discourse that 
shifts the onus for explanation onto what are now perceived to be countries that ‗deviate‘ 
from the expected progression of the Spring.
7
 This has led to media descriptions of Algeria as 
the ―odd-man-out‖.8 Such assumptions are also partly underpinned by the link made outside 
the Arab World between the revolutions and modernist notions of progress, accompanied by 
a sense of relief among liberal-minded westerners that the Arab World is interested in ‗our 
type‘ of democracy after all.9 That the initial Arab revolutions have been conflated with a 
desire for secular liberal democracy is further evident in perplexed reactions in the media to 
Islamist electoral victories, which seemed to confirm the fears of conservative Western 
narratives on the Spring.
10
 
The Algerian protests are qualitatively different in two respects from the mass 
demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt, which led to the downfall of Ben Ali and Mubarak. 
Firstly, they are geographically fragmented. These localised protests are not limited to 
Algeria‘s largest cities, and have left few corners of the country untouched. These protests are 
also organized differently from those seen in Tunisia or Egypt during the Arab Spring, since 
they occur not in main squares and emblematic public spaces, but in front of council offices 
and at makeshift roadblocks, highlighting their specificity in both intent and audience. 
Secondly, the protests articulate specific issues affecting limited groups of people. The 
immediate causes of these protests fall into several main categories: insufficient availability 
of housing and disputes over who should be on recipient lists for new social housing; 
insufficient infrastructure, including the poor state of roads or other means of transport 
(especially after accidents) and, to a lesser extent, the reliability of water and electricity 
                                                          
3 See ―Why has the Arab Spring not Spread to Algeria?‖, in The Huffington Post, 04/03/11. 
4 See ―Why narrowly cast the push for democracy as the ‗Arab‘ Spring?‖, in The Guardian, 22/02/12; ―González vaticina 
que la ‗primavera árabe‘ desbordará el mundo islámico‖, in El País, 14/03/12; US senator John McCain has said that the 
Spring should spread to Iran, China and Russia (BBC News, 10/16/11). 
5 Kadri, ―The Arab Spring and the ‗Unemployment Trap‘‖, Global Research, 15 December, 2011 
(http://www.globalresearch.ca). 
6 Comaroff and Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (Boulder, 1992). 
7 In addition to the article below on Algeria, see also ―Why Sudan is yet to see an Arab Spring?‖, The Guardian 07/12/11. 
8 See ―Why has the Arab Spring not Spread to Algeria?‖, in The Huffington Post, 04/03/11. 
9 See ―Why narrowly cast the push for democracy as the ‗Arab‘ Spring?‖ (The Guardian, 22/02/12), which not only equates 
the Spring to the French Revolution, but also hopes that a more ―compliant‖ Islam might emerge from it. 
10 See ―El aprendizaje de la decepción‖, in El País, 29/02/12; ―Libyan leader‘s embrace of Sharia raises eyebrows‖, 
26/11/11, at www.cnn.com; ―Muslim Brotherhood top winner in Egyptian election‖, in USA Today, 12/04/11. 
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supplies; environmental protests over waste dumping; student protests over changes to the 
higher education system and campus facilities; and labour related disputes, including those 
relating to job security, salary and sectorial strikes by teachers, doctors and other workers.
11
  
The immediate concerns motivating Algerian protests thus point exclusively to socio-
economic motivations that express local or sector-specific issues. Protesters do not appear to 
be demanding a change of government – much less democracy. Rather than articulating 
explicit demands for political change at national level, the protests in Algeria represent the 
normal channel used by communities or groups to articulate their demands to the state. This 
points to the existence of a radical, demand-based popular political culture that employs 
direct action to communicate with the state.
12
 In this sense, Algerian historian Daho Djerbal 
has rightly described Algeria as being ―in a phase of political activism without political 
expression‖.13 Now well over five years  old, this cycle of localised protests and piecemeal 
palliative measures has become part of the structural relationship between state and society, 
in which both sides have learned to absorb high levels of localised protests and rioting. As a 
result, the riots that broke out in Algiers in December 2010 on the eve of the Arab Spring did 
not have the same impact on public opinion as the disturbances in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Algerian society was simply not shocked, while Algerian police are well-trained in dealing 
with protests and riots. 
Algeria‘s cycle of protests, riots and strikes would therefore seem to respond to unique 
internal dynamics, rather than regional ones, in their motivation, expression, and in the social 
meanings attached to them. To understand some of these internal dynamics, this paper will 
begin by examining social memory in order to explore issues that help to explain the level of 
social unrest, specifically looking at how socially held views of the past contribute to 
defining what Algerians expect from their political system. Secondly, the paper will 
investigate why this unrest remains at local level, by looking at how the ways in which the 
past is remembered in Algeria constitute barriers to contemporary political change. The 
intention here is not to use memory as a catch-all explanation to the exclusion of other 
factors, but rather to suggest that memory can be a useful tool to identify some of the 
dynamics underpinning Algerians‘ relationship to contemporary politics, and to political 
change in particular. Because this paper is concerned with how the remembrance, experience, 
and enactment of the past affects present political subjectivities, the paper‘s organization will 
not be chronological, but instead will alternate between describing various narratives on the 
recent Algerian past, and exploring their effect on contemporary political attitudes. To begin 
with, this paper defines and describes some useful conceptual aspects of social memory, 
before analysing the fragmented nature of social memory in Algeria by looking at the 
officially-sponsored historical narrative and its relationship with popularly held narratives of 
the past. These, coupled with generational cleavages, provide keys to understanding the 
social fragmentation that acts as the major factor inhibiting a possible coalescence of many 
localised acts of protest into a larger movement demanding political change. Secondly, this 
paper will look critically at the concept of fears of a return to the violence of the 1990s, a 
factor often cited in arguments seeking to explain the absence of revolutionary change in 
Algeria,
14
 by recontextualising the effects of the 1990s through the truncated hopes that 
                                                          
11 This list is a compilation of personal observations and the unpublished work of Sarah Covington; an attempt at providing a 
diary of the protests and their causes can be found at http://berthoalain.com/documents/emeutes-en-algerie/. 
12 Jabi (2012) ―The Impasse of Political Transition in Algeria: Three Generations and Two Scenarios‖, Case Analysis Series, 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, p. 27. 
13 See article ―Knowledge and Power in Algeria: an Interview with Daho Djerbal on the Twentieth Anniversary of Naqd‖, by 
Miriam Haleh Davis, 31/01/12 at www.jadaliyya.com. 
14 See ―Argelia, ¿la tercera revolución?‖, in El País, 14/02/11; the radio programme, ―Avoir vingt ans à Alger‖, France 
Culture, 16/03/12; ―Algerians go to polls in nation left behind by Arab Spring‖, in The Guardian, 09/05/12. 
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emerged from the riots of October 1988. This provides a more helpful starting point in 
understanding Algeria‘s current lack of appetite for the Arab Spring.   
 
Social Memory 
 
Collective or group memory is sometimes represented as transcending the individual, and 
such representations risk slipping into a metaphysics of group thought that gives rise, for 
example, to notions of ‗the Arab mind‘,15 or more frequent depictions of a homogenous Arab 
‗outlook‘.16 While it is crucial to understand that only the individual remembers, individuals 
do inhabit a social world that shapes what is remembered. Social groups can have memories 
just as they can have identities, ideas, styles and discourses, all of which are more than the 
sum of individual subjectivities.
17
 However, inappropriate individualisation and 
psychologisation of social memory leads to discussion of entire social groups remembering, 
forgetting, repressing and experiencing amnesia – or in the case of Algeria, trauma. In 
addition to being problematic for the absence of any methodological adjustment between the 
individual and the group, such language draws on outdated Freudian imagery that would 
make most contemporary psychologists blush.
18
 For the purposes of this research, the term 
social memory, defined by Geoffrey Cubitt as a ―process by which knowledge and awareness 
of the social past are generated and maintained in human societies‖,19 is preferred over 
collective memory, since it locates the mechanisms that transmit memory firmly within the 
praxis of social relationships,
20
 recognising that memory is filtered through processes of 
interpretation grounded in social contexts.
21
 As opposed to systematically encoded and 
institutionalised historical narratives as authoritative sources of knowledge, social memory 
does not attempt to provide an objective map of the past, but establishes narratives of socially 
located experience embodied and performed by individuals.  
 Any current social view of the past is the end product of political struggles over 
meaning in the social world. The importance of social memory lies in the fact that 
representations of the past articulate a sense of continuity and commonality in social 
existence – telling us about our present community or nation – and therefore often ―hinge on 
backward projections of current perceptions of identity‖.22 The contested nature of Algeria‘s 
political historiography amply demonstrates the use of history as a tool to legitimise or 
challenge present power relationships, implying that social memory is both the result of 
previous struggles over social meaning and a lens through which contemporary politics is 
perceived. When looking at social memory, the relationship between the past and the present 
is dialectical: our assessments of the present influence the way the past is viewed, while 
social memories of the past influence our relationship with present events. These two 
different kinds of past-present relationship must be viewed as interlinked: our perceptions of 
the past are historically conditioned, but the development and articulation of a sense of the 
past makes a profound contribution to the unfolding of historical process
23
. As Barry 
                                                          
15 Patai, The Arab Mind (New York, 2002).  
16 Nydell, Understanding Arabs (Boston, 2006). 
17 Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester University Press, 2007). 
18 Kansteiner, ―Finding Meaning in History: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies‖, History and Theory 
41, 2 (2002), p. 179-97. 
19 Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 26. 
20 McDougall, ―Social Memories ‗in the Flesh‘: War and Exile in Algerian Self-Writing‖, Alif Journal of Comparative 
Poetics, 30 (2010), 34-56. 
21 Zerubavel , ―Social Memories: steps towards a sociology of the past‖, Qualitative Sociology 19, (1996), 283-299; Confino, 
―Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method‖, American Historical Review (1997) 102(5):1386-1403. 
22 Cubitt, History and Memory, p. 200. 
23 Ibid. 
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Schwartz describes, the past is ―matched to the present both as a model of society – since 
memory reflects past events in terms of the interests, fears and aspirations of the present – 
and as a model for society, because memory embodies both a template that organises 
behaviour and a frame in which people locate and find meaning for present experience‖.24  
 
The Algerian Past Fragmented 
 
Much of the literature on memory is concerned with power relations. Maintaining that the 
past is remade in the present for present purposes necessitates a focus on the ways political 
elites use state institutions such as education systems to foster a sense of national belonging 
and recount the past as a narrative that increases legitimacy.
 25
 In this sense, ―people are 
shown not what they were, but what they must remember having been‖.26  
Since independence in 1962, postcolonial nationalism in Algeria has formulated an 
official historiography that has explicitly set out to decolonise history.
27
 The creation of an 
official narrative on the past was crucial in bolstering the legitimacy of a populist 
revolutionary political system that was backed up ―neither by longstanding tradition nor by 
universal suffrage‖.28 Standing at the centre of this historiography is the idea of 130 years of 
continual anti-imperialist struggle based on a binary opposition between a united nation and 
its colonial enemy.
29
 This opposition was ultimately rooted both in the salafi discourse of 
Arab-Berber unity and the political culture of the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA).
30
 The 
Algerian salafiyya movement had been of crucial importance in articulating an ancestral 
resistance against ‗Occidental‘ invaders as the total meaning of history, thus portraying 
armed resistance to French colonial rule as inevitable.
31
 The historiography of the 
postcolonial state has also created a pantheon of martyrs of the liberation struggle whose 
sanctification as national heroes has reduced individual experiences and local memories of 
the war to a single unified narrative of recognisable events and trajectories in the name of a 
faceless populism.
32
 The colonial period is depicted as a parenthesis, albeit a long and painful 
one, after which the pre-existing Algerian nation was once again able to recover control of its 
own destiny and reassume its ancestral Arab-Islamic identity.  
This narrative masks alternative historical possibilities, as well as ignoring the extent to 
which many Algerians learned to work the colonial system to their own advantage or even 
collaborated actively with it. Crucially, it also denies that nationalist categories of thought 
and practice have their roots in the colonial period, when Muslim Algerians were excluded 
from French valeurs républicains on religious grounds, causing the Muslim signifier to 
become the space within which nationalist identity condensed. Colonialism thus made it 
possible to imagine the nation.
33
 During the war of independence, the Front de Libération 
                                                          
24 Idem, p. 245-6. 
25 Hobsbawm, ―Introduction: Inventing Traditions‖, in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 1-14; Megill, ―History, Memory, Identity‖, in Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A 
Contemporary Guide to Practice, (Chicago, 2007) p. 41-62.  
26 Foucault (1974), ―Film in Popular Memory‖, in Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy (eds.), The Collective Memory 
Reader (Oxford, 2011), p. 253. 
27 Lacheraf, L’Algérie: nation et société (Paris, 1965). 
28 McDougall, ―Martyrdom and Destiny‖, p. 51. 
29 Lacheraf, L’Algérie: nation et société, p. 203-281. 
30 (Parti du Peuple Algérien). The PPA‘s predecessor, the Étoile Nord-Africaine, was the first to invoke the main themes of 
revolutionary nationalism: anti-capitalism, rural issues and independence. See Ruedy, Modern Algeria. Origins and 
Development of a Nation (Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 137. 
31 McDougall, ―Martyrdom and Destiny‖. 
32 Scheele, Village Matters: Knowledge, Politics and Community in Kabylia, Algeria (Woodbridge, 2009). 
33 McDougall, 'The Fetishism of Identity: Empire, Nation and the Politics of Subjectivity in Algeria‖ in Chalcraft and 
Noorani (eds.), Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony (Basingstoke, 2007). 
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Nationale (FLN) set about reducing the political diversity of inter-war Algerian nationalism 
by monopolising the legitimacy of armed struggle
34
 and subsequently editing out all 
contributions made by rival nationalist figures and movements from official history. As a 
result, in Algeria political history is at once ―paradoxically present and absent, mobilised in 
immediate consciousness and severed from its genesis‖.35 
However, officially-sanctioned historical narratives do not have a monopoly on 
representations of the past and the formation of social memory. In Algeria, the official use of 
the past as an instrument of power incites a generalized popular mistrust of history and a 
particular focus on the vested interests of those who lay claim to historical knowledge. Judith 
Scheele has pointed to a widespread conception among Algerians that ‗true‘ history has been 
hijacked, held under lock and key and manipulated by specific social groups or the political 
elite.
36
 The absence of historical ‗truth‘ is therefore often used to explain the moral defects of 
the political system and the inequalities it produces. It follows then that, for many Algerians, 
future political change is predicated upon recognition of historical ‗truth‘ and that 
conceptions of stolen history are necessarily accompanied by popular notions of what 
constitutes the ‗real story‘.37 
Official historiography in Algeria is criss-crossed by a series of alternative set narratives 
on the past. These narratives are articulated around the official historiography, borrowing 
some parts of it and rejecting others, in a relationship that is perhaps best understood as a 
series of parallel narratives that converge, overlap, diverge and intersect both in content and 
over time, rather than as a series of mutually exclusive, frontally opposed versions of the past. 
The common denominator is that most narratives lay claim to revolutionary legitimacy, 
reproducing the official narrative by placing the war of independence at the centre of 
constructions of political and historical meaning. Indeed, this interdependent relationship 
goes some way to explaining the staying power of the official narrative. Despite the 
seemingly organic nature of this relationship, it should not be forgotten that while these 
narratives are based on past events and used to explain the present, they are also used to 
legitimise versions of the present or visions of the future, and are therefore integral parts of 
urgent social contests over power relations in the present. My task will now be to examine the 
content of these narratives and to explore their effects on the ways in which Algerians relate 
to contemporary politics. The first set of narratives emerged directly after independence in 
summer 1962, from the power struggle that took place between different Algerian groups, but 
the narratives have their roots in wartime rivalries and suspicions. The second set of 
narratives relates to the socialist nation-building period under President Houari Boumediene 
(1965-1978). The third set of narratives on the past emerges from the economic crisis and 
social turbulence of the 1980s, articulating religious and ethnic paradigms of mobilisation.  
The summer 1962 narratives have their origins in the two neat distinctions made during 
the war by nationalist leader Ramdane Abane at the Soummam Congress. At this secret 
meeting held in 1956 at Ouzellaguen in Kabylia, Abane and other leaders attempted to 
establish clear roles among the different forces involved in the struggle for Algerian 
independence.
38
 The first of these distinctions was between internal military forces, or the 
maquis fighting inside Algeria, and the armée des frontières, which was stationed in Morocco 
and Tunisia for the duration of the war. The fighting between Algerian groups after the war 
has given rise to a narrative according to which the external military forces took control of 
                                                          
34 Harbi, Le FLN, Mirage et réalité (Paris, 1980), p.  131-140; Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, p. 138-148. 
35Carlier, ―Mémoire, mythe et doxa de l‘État en Algérie. L‘Étoile Nord-Africaine et la religion du Watan‖, in Vingtième 
Siècle. Revue de l’Histoire, 30 (1991)‖, p. 82. 
36 For one example of this translated into contemporary Algerian hip hop, see the song Il était une fois l’Algérie (Once upon 
a time there was an Algeria) by the group Intik, from their 2001 album, La Victoire. 
37 Scheele, Village Matters. Knowledge, Power and Community in Kabylia, Algeria (Woodbridge, 2009).  
38 See Ruedy, Modern Algeria. The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington, 2005). 
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the state at the expense of the internal maquis, which the narrative casts as the true essence of 
the anti-colonial struggle and the rightful heirs to the levers of state power. The second 
distinction made at the Soummam Congress was between the political and military branches 
of the nationalist movement, a split manifested in the internal struggle toward the end of the 
war between the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) and the Gouvernement Provisioire de 
la République Algérienne (GPRA). This split has led to another narrative that sees the 
fighting of summer 1962 as having resulted in the army marginalizing the political authority 
that had negotiated independence with France, signalling the beginning of an uninterrupted 
military domination over the Algerian state.
39
 
Both of these narratives rest on the idea of ‗confiscated independence‘,40 in which the 
revolution is stolen from its ‗rightful‘ heirs. As such, these narratives reflect a strong feeling 
of ownership over a decolonisation struggle which is clearly recorded in social memory as a 
collective struggle, but not as a corresponding feeling of collective ownership over the 
postcolonial order. These narratives thus use the war as a starting point to explain what they 
see as a hidden group of shadowy figures that has controlled the state since independence. 
The theme of confiscation is also visible in two other narratives also related to the immediate 
post-war order. The first of these is a feminist narrative, in which independence was 
confiscated from women who had fought and participated in the war in large numbers but 
were subsequently marginalised from public office and sent back to the home.
41
 The second 
narrative casts the revolution as having been confiscated by Colonel Houari Boumediene 
after his coup against President Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965, putting an end to what is 
portrayed as an era of ‗left socialism‘ reflected in syndicalism and self-management and 
replacing it with an authoritarian brand of state-centric ‗right socialism‘. This narrative 
gained more traction among the French left that had supported the FLN during the war, and 
never gained broad adherence in Algeria itself.
42
 
Narratives also exist that relate the Algerian past explicitly to the Boumediene era, 
especially the period following the nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources and land 
redistribution in 1971 and the extension of free healthcare in 1973. The Boumediene period 
can be characterised by authoritarian state-led development based on the use of hydrocarbon 
rents to industrialise the Algerian economy, as well as by broad claims of social justice and 
redistribution of wealth. Fuelled by a clear project of nation-building and a regime with the 
political will and popular legitimacy to carry it out, this period was not only about creating 
strong institutions, but about producing Algerians, fusing a heterogeneous population into a 
single unified national body.
43
 
Nostalgia for the Boumediene era is well attested in the literature focusing on the 1980s 
and 1990s,
44
 and is reflected in popular narratives of the period as a golden age of social 
justice and national pride.
45
 Under Boumediene, Algerians enjoyed rising living standards 
                                                          
39 For a look at these narratives from the perspectives of their originators, those who lost out in the power struggles 
following independence, see Aït Ahmed, La guerre et l’après guerre (Paris, 1964); Harbi, Le FLN. Mirage et réalité 
(Paris, 1980); Abbas, Autopsie d’une guerre (Paris, 1980).  
40 The term is borrowed from Maschino and M‘rabet, L’Algérie des illusions, la révolution confisquée (Paris, 1972). 
41 Taleb Ibrahimi, ―Les Algériennes et la guerre de libération nationale. L‘émergence des femmes dans l‘espace public et 
politique au cours de la guerre‖, in Harbi and Stora (eds.) La Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004, la fin de l’amnésie (Paris, 
2004). 
42 Maschino and M‘rabet, L’Algérie des illusions. 
43 Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria (London, 2003). 
44 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000. A Short History (Cornell, 2001); Roberts, The Battlefield; Evans and Phillips, Algeria. Anger of 
the Dispossessed (New Haven, 2007). 
45 Agood example of nostalgia for the period can be seen in the article ―Revisiter la mémoire de Houari Boumediène‖, in El 
Watan, published 13/12/11. For a glimpse how opposing narratives on the period interact, see the animated debate on 
Boumediène‘s legacy in the readers‘ comments section of the same article.  
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and employment opportunities, resulting in relative prosperity and above all, stability
46
 – a 
key factor in later perceptions of the period. Many Algerians looked back through the harsh 
realities of the economic collapse and liberalisation of the 1980s and the violence of the 
1990s to ―les temps quand l’Algérie pensait par elle même‖ (the time when Algeria thought 
for herself),
47
 when enthusiasm for the future was coupled with pride in Algeria‘s place in the 
world as a leader of the Non-Aligned movement, its willingness to stand face-to-face with the 
former colonial power, and the attempt to single-mindedly chart a new course between Soviet 
socialism and Western capitalism, giving a strong sense that being Algerian counted for 
something. In stark contrast to subsequent Algerian presidents, there are no jokes about 
Boumediene, who is respected for his redjla (masculine toughness).
48
 However, this nostalgia 
is far from all-encompassing. An alternative narrative on the 1970s, and especially of the 
figure of Boumediene himself, couches the period as an authoritarian project that never 
delivered on its promises of modernisation, and even blames the populism of the 1970s for 
the dissident attitude to the state during the 1980s and 1990s.
49
 Significantly, the Boumediene 
period is also the longest period of stability experienced by Algeria since independence. As 
such, this often ignored period
50
 is arguably as important as previous or subsequent periods of 
instability and violence in understanding not only what it means to be Algerian, but also how 
Algerians construct narratives of the past and how these influence what people expect from 
the state. 
Contemporary manifestations of popular discontent in Algeria articulate a generalised 
feeling of hogra, a term that is omnipresent in popular political discourse in Algeria and 
which Roberts has translated as ―contempt, disdain or violating a person‘s right to 
consideration‖.51 But hogra represents more than a general sense of injustice. It expresses a 
bitter disappointment and outrage that the state has not lived up to its promises and reflects a 
sense of having been cheated by history. As such, hogra expresses a deep split in state-
society relations. Popular notions of what constitute positive state-society relations remain 
largely defined by the past desire to overcome the humiliations of colonialism through the 
self-proclaimed objectives of the independent state: equality, redistribution of wealth, dignity 
and often a sense of personal involvement in making the country a better place. That today‘s 
endless cycle of strikes, sit-ins and riots resonates with these principles indicates that 
Algerians continue to identify strongly with the emancipatory promises made by postcolonial 
nationalism.
 
Indeed, according to the World Values Survey, Algerians prize justice, equality 
and the protection of the most needy above all else.
52
  
Other socially held views of the past in Algeria include the two major narratives that 
emerged from the liberalisation and identity politics of the 1980s: the ethnic/secular and 
religious/authoritarian paradigms advanced respectively by Berberism and Islamism. The 
emergence of such non-nationalist identity paradigms articulated social discontent over 
falling living standards during the 1980s, and by the 1990s advocates of these paradigms 
were engaged in a headlong struggle to monopolize the symbolic capital of political 
community that ended in an armed conflict regularly quoted as having cost an estimated 
200,000 lives.
53
 The Islamist narrative emerged during the early-1970s and maintained that 
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the war of independence had been a jihad against the French, a religious struggle that was 
subsequently hijacked by a secularising postcolonial order that reeked of atheism and 
socialism.
54
 Berberism has created a linguistic opposition between French and Standard 
Arabic as colonial imports, and Tamazight (Berber) and dialectal Arabic as Algeria‘s true 
languages. This division is based on a view of Arabs as just another wave of invaders that 
Berbers (as the ‗true‘ Algerians) have fought against. As such, Berberism borrows from the 
official narrative‘s insistence on resistance to outside invaders. Essentially a product of 
Kabylia, which was an important stronghold of the maquis during the war of independence, 
Berberism also frequently reproduces the summer 1962 narratives.
55
 Islamist and Berberist 
narratives therefore both lay claim to and reproduce nationalist historiography, leading 
Azzedine Layachi to conclude that both Berberists and Islamists have used the same 
oppositional paradigm, the only difference being the identity marker employed.
56
 In addition, 
nationalist discourse has included both Islamic and Berber elements, despite their subordinate 
positions within the nationalist framework. 
Ethnic and religious paradigms articulated the burgeoning social discontent of the 1980s, 
but have masked the socio-political concerns that generated them in the first place, leading to 
an excessive – and largely unhelpful – focus in the literature (and in Algerian politics) on the 
issue of cultural identity. As such, debates over national identity have therefore been 
misconstrued as ―the site of the problem and of politics‖.57 As sterile debates between 
voluntaristic conceptions of Algeria‘s personality have raged on, paradoxically, the identity 
paradigms produced during contests over political legitimacy have acquired lives of their 
own, and now constitute real issues in themselves that cannot be ignored. However, since the 
mid-2000s, identity paradigms have been showing clear signs of exhaustion as vehicles for 
channelling political and social discontent and are now almost totally absent from 
contemporary protests in Algeria.  
The existence of multiple narratives demonstrates the fragmented nature of socially held 
memories of the past in Algeria. The previously made point that perceptions of the past and 
present reinforce each other in a dialectic relationship is useful here. On one hand, memory is 
made in the present and ―hinges on backwards projections of current perceptions of 
identity‖,58 meaning that a contested past is the result of a contested present. In this view 
Algeria‘s fragmented social memories simply point to a lack of consensus both in 
assessments of the present and in visions for the future. On the other hand, memory 
simultaneously provides a template on which perceptions of the present are based, that guides 
behaviour and provides a program through which present conduct can be formulated and 
enacted, meaning that a contested past also results in a contested present. In this view, the 
fragmentation of social memory plays a key role in inhibiting the development of large scale 
movements demanding political change.  
The fragmentation between different groups articulating different versions of the past 
is even spatially visible in journalist Ghania Mouffok‘s description of one of the protests held 
by the Arab Spring-inspired Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie 
(CNCD) on 12 February 2011 in Algiers. Massively outnumbered by riot police, the 
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relatively small group of protesters were divided over the presence of former FIS leader Ali 
Belhadj and by a small but vocal counter-demonstration of young people instantly labelled as 
―yobs‖ by many protesters. Mouffok describes the formation of ―one circle of police to 
contain the Islamists who, after negotiations, accepted to be present as individuals rather than 
as a party; another circle to surround the democrats, and yet another to encircle the ‗yobs‘. 
Algeria shattered, divided, gaping wounds and cordial hatreds‖.59  
 Generational divides also run parallel to Algeria‘s fragmentation in terms of social 
memory. Although intuitively appealing, the idea that shared experiences of socio-economic 
and political conditions lead to the formation of cohesive generational cohorts, which then 
respond in similar ways to subsequent conjunctures, seems to have a questionable basis. 
Deciding where to draw lines between generational units can be arbitrary, and other 
transversal factors such as ethnicity, gender, class or region may be just as important in 
defining how individuals react. Indeed, while many young people may ignore or be unaware 
of politics, research does suggest that high visibility events discussed frequently during 
formative years do have an effect on later attitudes.
60
 As a much under-researched area in 
studies of North Africa, generational differences may provide insights into how socially held 
perceptions of the past are transmitted within social relationships, helping to ground studies 
of memory. 
Abdel Nasser Jabi has identified three broad generations in Algeria, and has analysed 
the relations between them in relation to potential political change. The independence 
generation has rural and popular origins and received its political formation in the pre-war 
radical nationalist movements and during the War of Independence. Imbued with 
revolutionary legitimacy, this generation has been responsible for nation-building and has 
been at the helm of the Algerian state since independence. The second generation came of 
age after independence, is predominantly urban and educated, and carried out the function of 
economic and social management under the oversight of the first generation. As bureaucrats, 
technocrats and (semi) skilled professionals brought up in the one-party state, this generation 
has little experience of independent political activism. For Jabi, this reflects a broad split in 
Algerian political culture between the party-political and the bureaucratic-managerial. 
Despite familiarity through daily contact, the first generation has not handed over power to 
the second generation, which has never considered a rupture with its elders. Forming the bulk 
of Algeria‘s middle classes, the second generation is significantly fragmented by cultural and 
linguistic divisions between arabisants and françisants,
61
 and by the loss of social and 
economic status experienced as a result of the reduction of the public sector during the 1980s 
and 1990s, which caused an increase in union and party affiliations that often took on a 
nationalist, Berberist or Islamist flavour. The third generation came of age during the 1980s, 
amid economic crisis and austerity, urban problems such as lack of housing and water 
shortages, and can be defined by escapism from the humiliations and frustrations of daily life 
through raï music, football, and migration; cynicism regarding politics and a dim view of the 
possibility of collective change; and individualism and consumer desire. This generation has 
railed particularly against the first generation as being responsible for building a state that is 
at once omnipresent and impotent. The apolitical nature of the third generation, which now 
constitutes the majority of Algeria‘s population, prevents collaboration with the second 
generation, which in itself is so fragmented culturally and politically that it has been unable to 
provide middle-class backing or any kind of political framework to the street protests – unlike 
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in Egypt and Tunisia – sticking instead to corporatist demands within union or party 
structures that can be manipulated or bribed by the state.
 62
 
 The only middle-class led initiative for political change in the wake of the Arab 
Spring was the CNCD,  a heterogeneous mixture of opposition parties, public sector unions, 
human rights groups and youth organisations. This group collapsed into infighting over the 
presence of political parties and disappeared within a few short weeks. That the CNCD 
marches did not draw significant support from the youth and popular classes is indicative of 
continuing class and generational divides. Such divides were evident in the attitudes of many 
protesters to some of the much younger working-class counter-demonstrators, who were 
accused not only of being ―yobs‖, but of being ―paid by the authorities‖. One 22-year old 
counter-demonstrator, speaking to a journalist, summed up the attitudes of young working 
class Algerians: 
 
―We‘re just sick of it, they should go and fight their battles somewhere else, this is our 
neighbourhood, our country. When we demonstrate, they call us yobs and scum. Of 
course I feel bad about this whole situation, I‘m human too. So what‘s the difference? 
Just because they‘re intellectuals, it‘s a superiority complex. So why do they want us to 
join in their protest? At least when we demonstrate for two days, we manage to bring 
down the price of oil and sugar! What do they want with us? Those parties are just using 
us to make it big and get into power.‖
63
 
 
Interestingly, the journalist sarcastically mentions that the march never even got started, 
because ―like good civil servants‖, all the leaders of the coordinating body sloped off for 
lunch at midday, leaving protesters milling about aimlessly, before the young counter-
demonstrators took the square and began to demonstrate in their place, suddenly reversing 
their soundtrack to slogans in support of the Arab Spring. The young ―yobs‖ clearly had no 
problem demonstrating against the government; they just refused to do so with people they 
clearly saw as not representing them. 
Mark Tessler‘s work on political generations in Algeria is based on well-structured 
fieldwork looking at the effect of generational groupings on attitudes to political systems, 
economic outlook and cultural values. Tessler defines five generations according to the 
period in which participants came of age: Colonialism (pre-1954), War (1954-62), 
Boumediene (1965-1978), Bendjedid (1978-1988), and Contestation and Violence (1988-
1995), but finds little correlation between generational cohorts and present attitudes. 
Interestingly, the only generation exhibiting coherent views is the Boumediene generation, a 
finding which underscores the previously made point about the importance of this period in 
defining socio-political expectations. However, generational vocabulary does remain in use in 
Algeria as a way of periodising the past, as can be seen in Abdelaziz Bouteflika‘s speech at 
Sétif just before the May 2012 elections. He repeated three times the phrase, ―My generation 
has had its day‖, and told Algeria‘s youth that, ―those who liberated this country are telling 
you that we do not have the strength to continue. The country is in your hands. Take care of 
it.‖64 By using nationalist rhetoric and announcing the opening of the succession battle for the 
post-Bouteflika era, this dramatic and seemingly heartfelt speech was clearly intended to 
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bolster turnout figures ahead of legislative elections and to obtain a resounding vote of 
confidence in the political system as a whole.
65
 
 
Memory of the 1990s and the Post-Arab Spring Environment: Fear or Fatigue? 
 
Much recent media analysis of Algeria uses the concept of fear when seeking to explain the 
absence of nationwide movements of protest, specifically the fear of rocking the boat and 
risking a return to the violence of the 1990s.
66
 Some in Algeria have echoed these concerns in 
various ways. For example, left-leaning Islamist politician Abdallah Djaballah sums up the 
lack of appetite for fast-paced change in his assertion that, ―Algeria is still licking the wounds 
of its past‖.67 While initially attractive, this idea is problematic in that young Algerians in 
their twenties, the same demographic group that led protests in Egypt and Tunisia, did not 
live through the 1990s and therefore would not remember it directly. Algerians older than 30 
will remember the events of the 1990s all too clearly, so the fear and fatigue argument fits 
more neatly here. However, the silence enforced on discussions of the period by the fact that 
questioning the version of events established in the 2005 Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation is punishable by prison sentences have prevented the formation of cohesive 
social memory of the 1990s; as a result, references to this period in the public domain are 
fragmentary at best. An unwillingness to exchange the hard-won stability of the 2000s for a 
landscape of revolutionary uncertainty undoubtedly frames the attitudes of many toward the 
possibility of an Algerian Spring, and there is an undeniable sense of relief that scenes of 
violence can now be watched at a safe distance via satellite instead of being outside in the 
street. However, this picture of a nation wishing simply to finally get on with life is very 
different from that of a traumatised nation cowering in fear of a return to violence. 
 The focus on fear of a return to the 1990s is perhaps illustrative of the fact that much 
scholarship and media attention has focused on turbulent episodes of Algerian history, 
somewhat fetishizing violence in the process and making it into the defining feature of much 
analysis on Algerian society and politics.
68
 More than fear of violence, it is perhaps a 
combination of fatigue, disappointment and cynicism that are defining Algeria‘s relationship 
to political change in the wake of the Arab Spring. To understand this, it is necessary to look 
at memories of October 1988 and re-examine the role played by the 1990s in light of this.  
Widely perceived in Algeria as a turning point, and much talked-about and analysed 
in the media—allowing clearly-defined public perceptions of the events—the nationwide 
riots of October 1988 represented the largest-scale civil disturbances since the end of the war 
of independence. These riots represented an overtly political and cathartic expression of pent-
up frustrations and hogra by the 1980s generation. In a total rupture with accepted notions of 
authority, young people in the working-class Algiers neighbourhood of Bab el-Oued sacked 
the local police station, forcing the police chief to strip to his underwear before parading him 
through the streets and encouraging people to slap him.
69
 The harsh repression of young 
rioters by the army also represented a turning point for many in their parents‘ generation,70 
whose belief in the postcolonial system was shattered by the hitherto unimaginable scenes of 
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the National Popular Army turning its guns on the ‗People‘ it had proudly led to freedom 
from colonial rule. The wave of revulsion and outrage that followed immeasurably deepened 
the already growing rift between state and society.
71
 Finding himself backed into a corner, 
President Chadli Bendjedid announced a constitutional amendment allowing the formation of 
political parties, and Algeria witnessed the growth of a burgeoning civil society and a 
flourishing free press. However, in January 1992, the second round of legislative elections, 
which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win, were cancelled by the military 
and Bendjedid was forced to hand over power to a military-dominated High Committee of 
State, signalling the descent into civil conflict. 
October 1988 was the moment when the appetite for change was at its apogee, a 
moment that temporarily bridged the generational divide. In contrast, the 1990s were 
responsible for utterly exhausting the social energies released in 1988 and rechanneling them 
into mere survival
72
 during a decade of painful economic restructuring, international 
isolation, and horrific violence, as an entire nation‘s future plans for life were simultaneously 
put on hold.
 
If the 1990s are responsible for anything, it is not for instilling a sort of perennial 
fear of change, but for demobilising what was the most politically assertive society in the 
Arab World.  
However, it is not just the harsh realities of the 1990s that have been responsible for 
depoliticising Algerian society. October 1988 remains of key significance in relation to 
Algerians‘ perceptions of current political change because, as far as many are concerned, 
little tangible change has followed. Ali Yahia Abdennour, President of the Ligue Algérienne 
des Droits de l‘Homme (LADDH), has said that ―October 5 was a tidal wave, but once the 
water receded, all that remained were pebbles‖.73 Algeria has gone from the classic 
authoritarian politics of a one-party state to an authoritarian pluralism in which there is a 
―periodic distribution of shares among majority stakeholders‖74 and an underlying consensus 
among non-opposition political parties, despite various different self-branding strategies as 
nationalist, Islamist or secularist. In popular Algerian parlance, this complex state of affairs 
even has a name that eloquently expresses the high levels of both political savviness and 
cynicism palpable in Algeria: la démocrature.
75
  
Disappointment that the release of political energies in 1988 has not brought about 
real change mirrors and reproduces the theme of confiscation of the revolution at 
independence found in so many Algerian social narratives of the past. This points to the 
existence of a widely-held view that attempts at revolution have not borne out popular 
aspirations of greater freedom and social justice. This is not to say that Algerians no longer 
believe in these ideals – quite the opposite – but that because the still dearly-held zeitgeists of 
both November 1954 and October 1988 are both widely believed to have been confiscated by 
nebulous powers-that-be, the idea of change itself has become suspect.
76
 The cynical attitude 
toward political change is partly fed by the fact that the amorphous, acephalous and diffused 
nature of political power in Algeria, or whatever concepts are called to stand in for it – the 
deep state, le pouvoir, the generals – means that it is unclear exactly whom a revolution 
would topple. Even if President Bouteflika were to be overthrown, it is widely believed that 
he would simply be replaced by another leader without change occurring in the underlying 
power structure. In addition, it should be mentioned that Bouteflika‘s absence from public 
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view in recent years has helped transfer much popular disapproval onto Prime Minister 
Ahmed Ouyahia and Interior Minister Daho Ould Kabila.  
Compounded by the persistence of basic daily problems at the local level, Algeria has 
been experiencing massive alienation from politics
77
 and cynicism regarding the possibility 
of bringing about meaningful political change through collective means. Today‘s localised 
demand-based protests in Algeria are perhaps best seen as the remnants of October 1988, the 
frustrated desire for collective change turned in on itself. In this sense, while they gave 
overwhelming support to Tunisians and Egyptians after the overthrow of their respective 
presidents, many Algerians now feel the failure of October 1988 to bring about meaningful 
change may hold lessons for post-Arab Spring realities, since what is being depicted as 
Algeria‘s very own ‗spring‘ is often perceived as having led to instability, violence and 
massively reinforced military power. 
The strange post-Arab Spring environment seems to have given rise to something 
strikingly unfamiliar in Algeria: a coalescence of views that has resulted in an undeclared, but 
broad-based, consensus among unlikely bedfellows around the lack of support for an 
Algerian Spring. This consensus is refracted through social memories of October 1988 and its 
aftermath. For anti-Islamist nationalists, especially older people and the Boumediene 
generation, October 1988 is seen as having opened the door to radical Islamism, which is also 
perceived as having been the result of contemporary revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Similarly, both Islamist leaning and secular-democratic constituencies have seen the 
immediate aftermath of October 1988 as being responsible for the military takeover in 1992, 
an event echoed by the strengthening of military power in post-revolutionary Egypt. 
Contemporary events in countries that have experienced the Spring thus activate a series of 
concerns within different Algerian constituencies over Islamism and the role of the military, 
concerns that the emergence of narratives of a ―stolen revolution‖ in Egypt have done nothing 
to quell.
78
  
The Algerian government has been skilful in reflecting these multiple anxieties about 
political change back into the public sphere. One of these concerns is the spectre of foreign 
military intervention in relation to the NATO bombing campaign in Libya. Ahmed Ouyahia 
has characterised the Arab Spring as a ―plague‖ that has led to ―the colonisation of Iraq, the 
destruction of Libya, the partition of Sudan and the weakening of Egypt‖, alleging that the 
revolutions ―are not accidental but are the work of Zionism and NATO‖, whose member 
states have ―granted visas to young people according to their objectives, to train in new 
technologies to create unrest‖.79 In addition, the government has presented itself as the 
bulwark against the triple threats of an Islamist takeover, foreign intervention and general 
chaos.
80
 Algeria‘s regime became adept at presenting the strategy of après nous le déluge to 
European audiences during the 1990s, to international audiences post 9/11, and now, for the 
first time, for domestic audiences in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. After two decades of 
minimising the events of October 1988 as ―childish rowdiness‖, the Algerian government is 
now reinvoking the memory of the startling political changes that followed, allowing the 
regime to claim that Algeria has not only already had its spring, but was in fact a trailblazer 
for the whole region, and consequently has no reason to revolt.
81
 There is thus still a 
significant disconnect between these new regime representations of 1988 and the view of 
many in Algeria that 1988 was usurped and confiscated by shadowy military figures. Again, 
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despite their different interpretations of the event, both these narratives on October 1988 
converge in their assessments of an Algerian spring as being of dubious desirability, albeit for 
different reasons. Government insistence on a kind of ‗Algerian exception‘ echoes popular 
depictions of a lucky escape from a Spring that has been playing out in ways all too familiar 
to many Algerians, a sentiment expressed in journalist Kamel Daoud‘s bitter and, of course, 
cynical, remark: ―Where were our famous Arab brothers when we were getting out throats 
slit? It‘s their turn now.‖82 
 
Conclusion 
 
The daily round of protests in Algeria do not mirror those of the Arab Spring, but instead 
respond to internal Algerian socio-political dynamics that have their roots in the 
decolonisation struggle and the emancipatory promises of the post-independence populist 
politics, which have deeply instilled expectations of social justice and equality within 
Algerian society. The experience of the Arab World‘s most profound revolution83 and the fact 
that Algerians can look back to a period during the 1970s when the state seemed to be 
delivering on its promises of greater social justice – however they may characterise the 
politics of the day – are at the core of defining what Algerians expect from their state and are 
at the root of the willingness to voice unequivocal opposition to injustice that is a central 
feature of Algerian identity.   
However, this willingness to stand up against injustice can, of course, take different forms 
over time: to fight against the French, to join a collectivised farm or volunteer to plant trees to 
stop the advance of the Sahara, to battle – peacefully or otherwise – for a more Islamic social 
and political order, to fight for the officialisation of Tamazight or for changes to the Family 
Code, to demonstrate in front of council offices because decent housing should be available 
to all, to block a main road to protest about the worsening potholes that cause accidents, to 
burn tyres and smash windows out of frustration at a life that seems blocked at every turn or 
to strike because one‘s pay as a civil servant means one cannot afford meat more than once a 
week. The point here is that while the motivation for standing up for what is perceived to be 
right comes from similar roots, its expression varies over time and is currently taking solely 
localised or individual forms.  
The reason that fear does not explain Algerians‘ lack of willingness to follow the Arab 
Spring is that Algerians are patently far from afraid of standing up for what they believe to be 
right and making a noise about it. However, we must beware of essentialist portrayals of 
Algerians both as a people imbued with unshakable revolutionary spirit  that will bring unjust 
regimes crashing down, a view that only echoes officially-sponsored historiography, and a 
traumatised people cowering in fear of a return to the violence of 1990s. The real 
contradiction lies in the coexistence of the desire for social justice as a major motivational 
force behind localised protests, and a knowing cynicism in the ability of revolts and 
rebellions to bring about lasting political change. Indeed, groups of young men have recently 
been chanting ―The people want free hashish‖ at football matches, sarcastically echoing the 
popular Arabic slogan of the Arab Spring, ‗The people want the fall of the regime‘.84 With 
the rapid waning of enthusiasm for the Spring since what was widely perceived to be a 
French-dominated bombing campaign in Libya, and the timely distribution of hydrocarbon 
revenues in the form of public sector pay increases, easy credit, and assistance for young 
people wishing to set up small businesses, support for revolutionary change seems to be at an 
                                                          
82 ―Le Printemps Arabe, et si l‘Algérie avait raison?‖, 20/03/12, at www.jadaliyya.com.  
83 Roberts, The Battlefield. 
84 ―Algerians go to poll in nation left behind by Arab Spring‖, in The Guardian, 09/05/12. 
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all-time low and is accompanied by the realisation that things may not be so bad after all. 
Refreshingly for Algeria, support for getting on with life and once again trying to make the 
best of things seems to be at an all-time high.  
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